In this paper I explore the neglected harms of beauty. Some potential harms of beauty are widely recognised as issues of concern and are matters of considerable debate but others are almost wholly neglected. Primarily policy-makers, ethicists and lawyers have focused on harms to engaging individuals; cosmetic surgery recipients and beauty practices users. I argue that harms arising from such practices can largely be classified as ‘self-harm’; assuming a very broad definition of self-harm is adopted. A broad definition of self-harm includes the practices that individuals do to themselves, and those which they employ others to do to them. On this definition the focus on engaging individuals rather than on harms-to-others is perplexing as, on standard liberal models, harms-to-others are considered more morally significant than harms to the self. Prohibiting self-harm is often considered troublingly paternalistic in liberal contexts and yet in the beauty debate attention has almost exclusively been on the harms to engaging individuals. My aim is to highlight and investigate this striking gap and to argue that this neglect is a significant failure of theory and policy. I argue that the increased valuing of appearance in a visual and virtual culture, coupled with rising engagement and a rise in what is required to meet minimal standards of beauty, is already harmful to others.1 Moreover, if current trends continue and appearance continues to matter more then harms which are currently nascent are likely to become prevalent. I suggest that beauty harms should be reframed as public health concerns.
In order to make this argument, in section 2, I outline two discourses in which the harms of beauty are currently discussed; those of ethics and policy and feminist political philosophy. I do this to justify my claim that such debates have primarily focused on engaging individuals; and to consider the connection the feminist debate makes between beauty practices and a collective harm to all women. In section 3 I turn to overt harms-to-others; to harms beyond those which fall on currently engaging individuals. I introduce a number of possible bounce house for sale harms-to-others to indicate the breadth of potential beauty harms. In section 4 I consider three harms-to-others. Each of these harms is an example of a different type of beauty harm. I have selected these three harms in order to illustrate the range and extent of potential beauty harms and to show that in some cases clear harms are already being ignored and likely emerging harms are not being recognised and anticipated. Accordingly there are harms already occurring or emerging which merit response. The three harms I explore are: First, the direct harm to providers of beauty practices; second, the indirect but specific harm to those who are ‘abnormal’ and can never conform to minimal standards of beauty; and third, the indirect and general harm to all. I conclude that, contrary to current discourses, the most widespread and significant current and likely harms of beauty are not harms to engaging individuals, but to others. Accordingly theoretical work, as well as policy and practice recommendations, must pay attention to harms-to-others, as well as to engaging individuals, if they are to avoid advocating biased or counter-productive conceptions, policies and practices.