Hooker argues that something is good for well-being if a life with more of that element is always better than a life that is otherwise the same but has less of it. He goes through a list of things that come to mind as valuable in themselves and determines whether or not these things are actually intrinsically good using that simple test. While we agree with Hooker’s positive assessment – that innocent pleasure, significant achievement, important knowledge, autonomy, and friendship are distinct, valuable elements of life – we disagree with his negative assessment – that appreciating beauty and living a morally good life are not. Instead, we argue, both of these elements make a life better, independently of the other five values, and thus pass his test.
We first consider the appreciation of beauty. We believe that a life that contains appreciation of beauty is better than a life that is similar in other respects but does not contain appreciation of beauty. Appreciation of beauty thus passes Hooker’s initial test for an element of well-being, i.e., something that improves one’s life, a point with which Hooker agrees. The next question is whether it does so independently of the other valuable elements. Hooker considers two options: either appreciation of beauty is subjective or objective. If the former, he takes it to be instrumental in adding pleasure or friendship; if the latter, he takes it to be a type of important knowledge. In reply, we argue that appreciation of beauty could be an independent element of well-being, even if it is subjective, and not merely valuable for its contribution to pleasure or friendship. For example, one can appreciate beauty in a piece of artwork that makes us feel sadness, awe, shock, or horror. These are all emotional reactions that are not necessarily identical to pleasure or happiness, nor valuable for their contribution to pleasure or happiness, but can still improve a life.
Next, we consider the value of living a morally good life, which we also find independently, objectively valuable. Hooker writes that he lacks strong intuitions regarding whether living a morally good life is an objective element of well-being, independent of the other objective goods. Thus, he introduces a new test for an element of well-being, which is the question of whether we would feel sympathy for someone who lacked that element of well-being. He then argues that we would not feel sympathy for one who failed to live a morally good life, and hence that it does not belong in the objective list. However, we believe that Hooker is hasty in assuming that humans do not feel sympathy for someone who lives a morally incorrect life. We personally find it sad and pitiable when people resort to immoral acts because they are so unhappy or mentally ill that they cannot find meaning in moral action. While sympathy for immoral people is often buried under anger or fear, we cannot conclude that it fails to exist. Therefore, Hooker’s argument from our supposed lack of sympathy for immoral people is unsound.
We could also apply Hooker’s sympathy test to the appreciation of beauty as an independent element of wellbeing. We recognize the idea of something or someone being beautiful as an opinion, yet it is an opinion we frequently share with others to get them to appreciate the beauty we see in that thing or person we consider beautiful. Our continuous emphasis of sharing our appreciation of beauty with others on both an individual and societal level suggests that we place value on appreciation of beauty, and therefore have pity or sympathy for those who lack this element in their lives.
Lastly, when defending the independent, objective value friendship at the end of the paper, Hooker offers yet another new argument: the argument from diminishing marginal benefit. Here he argues that friendship is valuable, independent of being a significant achievement, because a life that was full of significant achievement would not be improved greatly by adding one more achievement, but a life that was full of significant achievement and friendless would be improved greatly by adding one friend. If you were unpersuaded by our previous arguments for the independent value of appreciation of beauty and living a morally good life, the argument from diminishing marginal benefit offers an alternative means to defend them. A life that was full of pleasures, friendship, and knowledge but lacked any appreciation of beauty seems, at least to us, to be improved greatly by adding even a small amount of appreciation of beauty. Similarly, a life full of the other goods on Hooker’s objective list but utterly immoral seems greatly improved by even a moment of moral rectitude.
We conclude that Hooker gives us good reason to believe that innocent pleasure, significant achievement, important knowledge, autonomy, and friendship are objective goods that improve a life. However, we argue that the same can be said for the goods Hooker rejects: appreciation of beauty and living a morally good life.